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Abstract 
The issue of fiscal federalism and the management of the country's resources has been a complex one 
among the federating multi-ethnic nations within the Nigerian federation. Several conceptual and 
theoretical analysis expounds the way economies can be managed in a bid to abridge developmental 
crisis. The crux of Nigeria’s problem lies in her federating arrangement started in 1954 till date which 
has culminated in poor fiscal arrangement, disparity in the sharing of resources among the local, state 
and federal government, minority domination, and agitation for resource control. Based on the above, 
this paper seeks to critically review the challenges of fiscal federalism and resource control in Nigeria. 
It argues that if the fundamental issue of resource control is not pragmatically addressed by the 
Nigeria state the problem could trigger another phase of insurgency in the Niger Delta, with grave 
implications for the nation’s economy. 
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1. Introduction 
The corporate existence of a people and government of a nation is conditioned upon the availability of the things 
that make life worth living. No country survives without the systematic management of its resources to meet the 
developmental goals of her people. Scholars agree that in a democracy the issue of government meeting her 
constitutional role compels her to act positively or negatively to various groups in the country. The economic 
survival of the people also makes them to interrogate whether a government is intended to subjugate, dominate 
and exploit them and their resources or to sustain them economically and pursue their common welfare. Public 
sector economics on the other provides a useful guide on how to divide functional responsibilities between the 
levels of government and how to allocate corresponding revenue resources (Nwaeke, Oruwari, and Amadi, 2012, 
68). 
 
Mugrave and Musgrave (2004) stated that a country's whole existence depends on the public sector for macro 
stabilization, income distribution and resource allocation. This is the obvious reason why Nigeria must start .a 
gradual increase in her growth level. The most striking issue in the Nigerian polity is how to equitably, fairly and 
justifiably share the country's resources among the competing interests in the federation of Nigeria. However, 
the federation of Nigeria came as a relationship between the states and its citizens based on certain rights and 
obligation such that the state making process resulted in the loss of certain rights- previously enjoyed by 
autonomous ethnic nationalities and communities and the assumption of certain obligations by both the citizens 
and the larger polity called the state. Ake (1997) stated that the people lost their right to an exclusive 
exploitation of the resources in their environment for their socio-economic well-being and preservation of the 
resources in their environment for subsequent generations. Such is the case when subjugating power takes over 
the natural rights of the aborigenes in order to ensure its effective control of the subjugated territory and build a 
coherent polity and economy (Owugah, 2008, 709). It is agreed that the subjugating authority assumes the 
responsibility of ensuring both the well-being as well as the personal and proper security of its citizens. The 
subjugating power before 1960 was Britain who colonized Nigeria and brought diverse autonomous ethnic 
nationalities and communities into the larger Nigeria polity. Thus, the present Nigeria state has transited 
through different political and administrative phases (the colonial, post-independence, military and the various 
democratic periods) with an appendage of various fiscal arrangement and resource management models. The 
colonial period was characterized by the penetration of the Europeans in search of trading links with natives and 
the introduction of a foreign system of worship and education that led to the expropriation of our resources abroad. 
This made the socio-economic position of the Nigerian state underdeveloped, dependent and fragile. 
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Owugah (2008) stated that the capacity of the post colonial Nigeria state to effectively promote the people's 
socio-economic well-being is blocked by three forces. First, is the absence of any national capitalist class at 
independence and the state not controlling its economy. Second, the heavy indebtedness to foreign powers, third 
the leadership's equation of public or political office holding with self-enrichment and not service to the people. 
This is situation we are now. 
 
The pre-independence period with the first time federal character formation because of the 1914 amalgamation 
hastened some features of dualism where the structure of budget is clearly shaped more by convenience than logic 
but not formal revenue allocation formula while-the post independent period witnessed a decrease of percentage 
share of the central government. Under the military, with the addition of mid-western region and the 
fragmentation of Nigeria into states, fiscal federalism and allocation created another round of review. But there 
is ensuring disparity in social and economic welfare responsibilities of the new states and the basis of their 
finances. The real test of fiscal federalism and resource management could be traced to the return of democratic 
rule in October 1979 but with a lot of conflicts, litigations and intense debates in the National Assembly with 
extensive lobbying and complicated manouvres land serious agitations for resource control. 
 
The agitation for fiscal federalism intensities the need for balanced development among the components that 
make up Nigeria (Amadi, Oruwari, 2008,03).  Federalism refers to the allocation of resources and 
responsibilities such as tax powers and expenditure responsibilities. A class work on fiscal federalism needs 
jurisdictional design and assignment to represent the smallest possible areas over which the benefits will be 
distributed. Nnanna (2000) stated that fiscal federalism enhances the efficiency of resource allocation for the 
provision of local public goods and services. Okigbo (1965) stated that with fiscal federalism levels of 
government have different responsibilities. Should resource devolution or decentralization involve the reallocation 
of tax jurisdiction or redistribution of tax revenues? Which level of government should benefit more from 
financial devolution? Is it the federal, states or local governments? What would be the most appropriate formula 
for sharing the centrally collected revenue? How can the federation account be administered in the manner that 
ensures transparency and minimization of intergovernmental distrust? And what proportion of oil resource should 
be allocated to oil producing states? The answers to these questions culminate into the agitation for resource 
control. Many views blame the kind of federalism in Nigeria where resources are controlled by the centre. So in 
the ethnicization of the state the elites among the major ethnic groups who control the centre transfer resources 
to benefit and develop areas other than where the wealth is coming from. This is the basis for the articulation of 
resource control which spurred the south-south states and civil society groups in Nigeria and overseas. The crux 
is glaring as meaningful transformation has not been achieved even with the 13 percent derivation by the 
deprived states. The population of people now reverses to efficient means by agitating qualitatively for 
management of resources for the common good. However, inspite of the hue and cry for resource control the 
Nigerian state creates doubt over its possibility, may be because of the fear of political equation and domination 
by the minority groups. In this regard -therefore this study intensify efforts to examine fiscal federalism and 
resource control; the implications in Nigeria's socio-economic system. The study is further structured into four 
sections. The introduction in section one, section two has theoretical framework. Section three treats Nigeria's 
fiscal experiences and the imminence of resource control option while section four has conclusion and 
recommendations.  
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
The heart of the average person in the globe strikes around the discuss of how the global economy functions and 
what it does and for whom. This serves the recent call for the Davos World Economic Forum. Have these 
meetings clearly contemplated the matter of income inequality, social injustice, and economic inequality? This 
gap seems to be such a structural feature of our world that for every country closing the gap appears to be some 
more falling further behind. But this does not amount to a polemic against wealth or people with wealth. We 
need wealth and more of it but do we ever think that wealth creation is a collective-endeavour? However in most 
cases, the reward for this joint effort inequality as the principal challenge of our time and called for a policy of 
establishing promise zones in impoverished communities. However instead of a shining revival of the local 
economy the policy is dark, almost medieval in its inspiration. This brings us to the crucial point. Unarguably, 
the Nigerian state emerged as a product of British colonial design, primarily for the purpose of material 
resources, rather than deliberate attempt to foster political integration and economic emancipation of the 
indigenous populace (Uranta, and Ibiamu, 2011, 191). The union of the Northern and Southern Nigeria without 
due cognizance to the socio-cultural relationships of the people culminated into federalism in. the country.  
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Federalism is  a form of government where the component units of a political organization participates in sharing 
powers and functions  in  a cooperative  manner,  though the  combined  forces  of ethnic pluralism and cultural 
diversity among others may tend to pull their peoples apart (Tamuno, 1999, 165). This statement is a replete of 
Marshal (1819) in Uranta, and Ibiamu (2011) that federalism magnifies national power at the expense of the  
state power even though critics are of the view that the constitution is a compact of sovereign states, not an 
ordinance of people. Fiscal federalism others see as resources control or what Omo Omoruyi prefer to call local 
control over local resources is variously conceptualized (Olasupo, and Erhun, 2008, 1135). It is the existence in 
one country of more than one level of government with each having different taxing powers and expenditure 
responsibilities (Temitayo, 1999:72). Fiscal federalism is the allocation of tax powers and expenditure 
responsibilities among the levels of government in a federation.  For Bisi Akande, former governor of Osun state, 
it is seen as derivation while Olu Falae sees it as deregulation. Ariyo (1990) succinctly talks of social fiscal 
federalism putting the modification of institutions and indigenous culture to order. This order condition the 
prerequisite for socio-cultural and geographical contiguity of the Nigerian state. The attempt to solve the twain 
problem of tax jurisdiction and revenue allocation is a pronouncement for equity and efficiency.  So, power 
distribution  and divisions between the levels  of government such that federal/state financial relationships 
revolves around who impose what kind of tax, and who takes what kind of shares of revenues raised by the 
governments. The guiding theory for resources allocation in Nigeria in recent times has been based on 
population, independent revenue, derivation, need, national   interest, minimum responsibilities, population and 
balanced development, equality of access to development opportunities, national minimum standard, absorptive 
capacity, independent   revenue and fiscal efficiency. Okhonmina (2008) opined that since that time the south-
south region has struggled to have adequate federal allocation from the oil resource that has had profound 
negative impact on the local environment. And that federal elites have employed the political tool to manipulate 
resource allocation in Nigeria so much so that it is counterproductive to the growth and development of the 
Nigerian  federation and  has been  irresponsible  to  the  socio-economic  and political aspirations of the Niger 
Delta.  So the resource control option, as historically valid is logical and tenable seeking the potency for 
transformation. The reason that manipulating resources breeds inequality so inequality is a system of a grower 
disorder. It is a consequence of an unjust philosophy of human interaction and of the economic machinery that 
distorts conceptualization (Brian, 2014, 68). It is likened to the farmer growing that which we cat for our humble 
sustenance as an essential service but his reward is not proportionate to his value. In the face of externalities the 
people are being jobbed and the dignity of meaningful labour is being slaughtered on the profane alter of 
financialism's domination of our economic lives. Hence Hayek (2004) contended that those who value liberty 
should prefer social pressure directed against deviant behaviour to outright bans; meaning simply, behaviour of 
which many people disapprove but which does not violate anyone else's right to life or property. Gene (2004) 
noted that negotiating between parties affected allows them to use the particular circumstances of time and place 
with which they alone are familiar to arrive at a solution.  It is therefore only when people demonstrate their 
preferences by exchanging can we say with any certainly that both parties felt that they would be better off in the 
subsequent state than in the prior one (Rothbard, 1997,79).  
 
3. Nigeria's Fiscal Experiences 
The continuum of Nigeria's fiscal federalism is transient' of the pie-independent and post independent fiscal 
structures. Post independent fiscal structure is further slated into military and civilian (democratic) fiscal systems. 
In the pre independent period spanning through 1861 to 1886.-Nigeria's administration was colonial with all 
three territories of colony of Lagos, the Niger coast protectorate  and Niger territories  of southern Nigeria  in  
1914 characterized a federal system of administration with Lieutenant governors in Lagos and Kaduna for each 
territories and an overall governor-general in Lagos for the central government. From that time the fiscal 
arrangement was that revenue and expenditure of the two governments in Northern Nigeria were merged as 
single budget (Tukur, 2005, 17). The period witnessed three budgets; central, northern and southern Nigeria 
printed in a single volume-a budget book. The revenue formed single fund to service aggregate demand. 
Naturally enough the budget was practically convenient retaining some features of dualism. Formal revenue 
allocation started in 1946 and with the internal authority by regions under the Richards constitution and 
responsibilities shared. The objective was to make available to all levels of government independent sources of 
revenue which would be adequate to undertake their constitutional functions and responsibilities. This period 
sought for acceptable formulae in conformity with changing realities. The Phillipson commission of 1946 was 
the first pre-independent report on fiscal allocation with three principles of derivation, even progress and 
population. However only the population principle was applied. Regional revenues were divided into two classes; 
declared revenues and non-declared revenues. Declared revenues where those collected by regions and non 
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declared revenues collected by the central government. Those of the federal government was shared among the 
regions as: Northern Region - 46% Western Region - 30% and eastern Region-24%. The second pre-independent 
report of Hicks-Phillipson 1951   introduced another principle of independent revenue, derivation, need and 
national interest. The third was chicks commission of 1953 with the principle of only derivation which 
recommended 50% of revenue to the federal government and the remaining 50% to the then regions. In 1958 
Raisman commission recommended the creation of distributable pool account. What went into distributable pool 
account was to be shared among the regions using general principles, continuity of government service, 
minimum responsibilities, population and balanced developments as for the, North-40%, West 24%, East 31% 
and southern Cameroons then, 5% and as they left their share was splited among the regions with 2.1% to the 
North, 1.3% to the west and 1.6% to the East. 
According to Adilieje (2008), the regions provided an excuse to avoid a truly federal structure based on ethnic 
states, rather than regions with multiethnic configurations that provided regional majorities with opportunity to 
dominate, marginalize and exploit regional minorities and sub minorities. The post independent revenue 
allocation review by the Binns Commission recommended revenue from the distributable pool account to be 
shared among the north, east and the west to 42%, 30% and 20% respectively.. No wonder finance is the most 
important factor that determines the extent of autonomy allowed to sub national governmental units in all 
governmental arrangements and the degree of peace and cohabitation among the governmental levels and 
citizens in a federation in particular (Marcellus, 2008). 
In January 15n 1966 Nigeria fell into the hands of the military. The inclusion of Midwestern region and the 
fragmentation of Nigeria into states created another system of fiscal federalism. Though rejected by the then 
military government on the ground that its range went beyond the military then. In 1968. Dina interim committee 
changed the distributive pool account to state Joint Account. There was also the creation of special grants 
account, permanent planning and fiscal commission. In addition was horizontal standards, balanced development 
and derivation. On a vertical formula, royalties from onshore mining was 10% for states of origin, 10% for 
federal government states joint account was 70% and special grants 5% with rents from on-shore operations to 
states on the basis of derivation at 100%. In 1977 the Aboyede Technical Committee recommended for vertical 
allocation on the basis of 57% for the federal government, 30% for the states, local governments 10% and 3% 
for special grants accounts. The military was more blessed with excess oil revenues but there was basically some 
problems i.e the glaring disparity in the social and welfare responsibilities of the new states and the basis of their 
finances. To this effect they restructured the expenditure of the states through the transfer of power to the centre. 
By this the states depended on revenue collected and distributed through the centre. But Marcellus (2008) argues 
that political observers believe that the lion share of the national revenue given to the federal government runs 
against the grain of the current global trend in federalism where the expectation is that the states and the local 
governments will increasingly constitute the nub of economic development and centres for the provision of 
social amenities and infrastructure. However, it could be said that the real test of fiscal federalism for Nigeria 
could be traced to the return of democratic rule from October 1999 but it must be admitted that since the 1992 
revenue allocation, the system of resource allocation has not undergone major metamorphosis in terms of fair 
review except the whims and caprices of the government in power that adjusts the revenue sharing formula to 
suit its interest (Tukur, 2005, 33). For instance after a lot of conflicts including litigation with intense debates in 
the National Assembly extensive lobbying and complicated manouvres, a new revenue allocation arrangement 
was enacted into law under the Allocation of Revenue Act No. 1 of 1982 with 55% for federal government, 
30.5% for states, 10% for local governments, 4.5% for oil producing communities (1% for ecological problem; 
20% on derivation principle and 1.5 directly for mineral producing areas). 
Nigeria and India's are famous for high percentage of vertical imbalance in favour of the federal 
government. India's 12th Finance Commission recommended 30.50% for both states and local government and 
69.50% for the central government from tax revenue collected between 2005 and 2010 (Rao, 2007, 334). In 
Nigeria the latest allocation formula as amended by the executive order in 2002 are such that federal government 
- 52%, states - 26.72%-.and local governments - 20.60% with an entitlement of 13% derivation from the oil 
producing states. However, this seems inconsistent with the current trends in federalism where governments 
share of revenue is not channeled through the states and local government (Marcellus, 2008, 597) such foregoing 
demonstrates that in an emerging democracy, the planning and management of fiscal relations between the 
federal and states will invariably have to depend on the prevailing concept of the federalism at a particular period 
in the economy as it is the federal constitution that expressly distribute revenues and taxing power. The present 
fiscal arrangement has manifested in weak fiscal capacity of the state and local governments. In a true federalism 
it would be better to bank any ration of sharing than for every part to contribute to the federal resources. The fact 
is that the communities where oil originates in Nigeria does attract any attention from the federal and even the 
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state governments in the face of these existing '-pattern of derivation. These are the reasons for calls for resource 
control.  
 
4. The Imminence of Resource Control Option 
The imminence of resource control no doubt is implicit in all ramifications the understanding of 
development by the people and government of a country. The debate on development spanning between 1950's 
and 1960's is seen by the newly developing states in economic terms as growth measured with the yearly 
increase in Gross Domestic Product (GNP) or Gross National Product (GNP) at rates of at least 5-7 percent or 
more as an acceptable indicator. The trust of this is that rapid gains in overall and per capita (GNP) growth 
would wither "trickle down' to the masses in the form of jobs and other economic and social benefits of growth 
(Perepreghabota, J. P. and Nabhon, T. A., 2008:1,158). However, the levels of living condition of the population 
of most people remain poor showing something being wrong with the definition of development. People within 
this condition must clamour for attacks on absolute poverty and unemployment implicit in increasing inequality 
in income distribution in any growing economy. Dudley (1969) thus showed concern asking what has been 
happening to poverty, unemployment and inequality? Any good answer to these questions we guess will solve 
major developmental problems in a developing economy. The crux of what is discussed above is likened to the 
Nigerian economy with flaws in developmental tenents that has instituted the call for resource control. In most 
cases this leads to insurgencies we are experiencing today. The reason is that the national resource of Nigeria is 
oil hence the combination of the country's localities with the centralization of oil revenues through state ventures 
create a sort of governable spaces which features gravious struggle of access to and control over the petrodollar 
oil rents. These spaces no doubt will culminate into political splinter groups with vociferous fragmentation of 
insurgents and militia groups. 
The New International Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary of English language define resource as that 
which is resort to for aid or support; and available means, or property, a supply that can be drawn on any natural 
advantage or products of natural material. Perepreghobofa and Nabhon (2008) see it as capacity or adapting 
means of power for achievement. And control by dictionary definition is to exercise, direct, restrain or having 
government influence over particular influence. Resource control therefore means a process of exercising or 
directing, restraining or having government influence over natural products found in one's area, be it human or 
material (Perepreghabofa, and Nabhon, 2008, 1,163). 
The crux of what has been discussed above is likened to the Nigerian economy concomitant in the 
Niger Delta struggle because of flaws in development hence the call for resource control. Resource control in 
Nigeria can be traced to the colonial era when the people of Niger Delta first participated in the struggle for 
politics and trade. The period marked the palm oil boom days where the king of Nembe, Nana of Itsekiri and 
king Jaja of Opobo were defiant against foreign domination. These were inclinations and tendencies to self 
assertion. Culminating from then to the foundation of the black-gold, first, struck in Olaibiri constituted another 
devastation instead of better standard of living of the people. Instead of developing the people where shell D' 
Archy tricked the first oil in 1956, the socio-economic life of the people become a night mare. The fact that they 
cannot farm and the aquatic was poisoned through pollution, life in these areas become miserable. The land Use 
Act of the central government confiscated the monetary relief that these communities would have benefited 
through the oil companies. This however, forced out Isaac Adaka Boro against the federal might conditioned 
upon their resolve to define the relationship in the different ethnic nationalities in Nigeria, the question of 
resource ownership, resources control, its use and management, the nature and structure of the Nigerian state 
with particular reference to the federating units, the absence of an acceptable constitution, the minority question, 
prevalence of poverty and oppression. 
This was followed by Ken Saro Wiwa's Movement for the survival of the Ogoni people (MOSOP) also 
demanding for their fair share from the resources from which the federal government make huge sums of billions 
leaving the people suffocating under flared hydrocarbon constituting vasco-cellular damage with poisoned water 
which the people drink. To crown this people, till now the UN Report to develop Ogoni land is still far fetch by 
the federal government. As the central government becomes adamant to the natural and indeed constitutional 
rights of the people the first to drag her to positive changes does not cease. All other agitations earlier carried out 
formed a precursory move to others. One of which is the "Kaiama declaration" formed by the Ijaw ethnic 
nationality of the Niger Delta in 1998. This group popularized the issue of resource control which aggravated 
subsequent debates. The reason that the minorities see it as an attempt by the majority ethnic groups to deprive 
them of the opportunity to enjoy the products from their God given resources (Ekhonmina, 2008, 779). Ever 
since a number of other "Bills of Rights" "Charters of .Demand" "Resolutions" and "Declarations" from many of 
the Niger Delta ethnic nationalities including the Urhobo, Kalahari, Oron, Ibibio, Ikwerre, among others have 
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been articulated (Perepreghobofa, and Nabhon, 2008, 1,165). Most current in this issue is south-south-governors 
forum. Using it as a platform to compel the central government they insist on the judicious means of allocating 
resources. By that they could commit the people in their various states. However it is argued that even the 13% 
derivation fund is not judiciously managed by these governors in there various states. May be that is the reason 
for the federal government admitting this advocacy as a call for war or secession. Whether the unity of Nigeria 
be comprised or not is a matter of judicious resource use and fiscal system that can benefit the population of the 
people conditioned upon resource endowment. 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The issue of fiscal federalism and the share of the country's resources has been a complex one among the 
multiethnic nations of the country, Nigeria. The fact that communities surrendered their sovereignty to become 
one of a confederating unit is not an impetus for more advantageous group to trample on their God given wealth. 
Being traumatized under a central system of share of resources that derogates their opportunity and right to 
ownership and development negligence, accompanied with unemployment and inequality, the people continue to 
remain poor and thus subservient to the aristocratic and opportunist rulers who continue to implement 
uncompromising resource sharing formula. In this regard therefore, and to complement existential realities, the 
down trodden minorities agitate for equitable distribution thought resource control and management. 
 
1) The system should not begrudge the minorities their wealth particularly where that wealth is 
commensurate with the value of their need as a people. 
2) The people's socio-economic system and the dignity of labour of the people of Nigeria should not be 
jobbed or being slaughtered on the profane alters of financialisms domination of their economic lives in 
the ambit of fiscal federalism. 
3) The New World Order is one of riches, so no longer should Nigerians be contented with promises that 
can be exscinded at any moment that detour from the most vital issues affecting the country. 
4) The whole economy needs substantial restructuring and recalibration of the relative values and wealth 
allocated to the real sector compared with the financial sector. 
5) And because the preponderance of empirical evidence suggests that an economy be stronger and more 
resilient, extreme riches and poverty should be mitigated. 
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